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et al.: Panel Discussion I

PANEL DISCUSSION I
PROFESSOR WRIGHT: I will exercise the moderator's
prerogative to put the first question to Dean Griswold and ask if
it is true that in his distinguished old age he has become the
modern-day Baron Parke and wants a rigid formalistic approach
to the law.
DEAN GRISWOLD: Thank you for giving me the opportunity to respond. I think I will open with a story about another
English judge who was a Lord Chancellor, but not regarded as
very distinguished. Unfortunately, I do not remember his name,
but we will call him Lord Smith. In one of the early editions of
Campbell's Lives of the Lord Chancellors,' one can turn to the
index and find "Lord Smith [subheading] 'His Great Mind'...
39." On page thirty-nine it says, "I have a great mind to commit
you for contempt." Insofar as my intention was concerned,
maybe not what I wrote, I think that the suggestion that I am a
Baron Parke is as misleading as is that passage in the index to
the Lives of the Lord Chancellors. Professor Wechsler points
out that there are some things that could be used to support this
suggestion when I object to discretionary justice. But I try hard,
at least in one passage, to say that the law was not and could not
be rigid and mechanical and that it is true, of course, that the
way it properly develops is by taking into account new developments, new circumstances, and new ideas, and using them to
modify and develop the law. I would be as far removed from
wanting to prevent that as were those eminent academics at Columbia University in Professor Wechsler's student days.
I think while I have the podium, I would like to take the
opportunity to pay a tribute. I suppose the reason I am here
today is Felix Frankfurter. He was my professor of federal jurisdiction and out of his teaching I developed a great interest in
not only the intellectual, "chess-playing" complexities of federal
jurisdiction, but also in the tremendous importance of the allocation and division of functions between the state courts and the
1. J.

LZVES OF
(London 1848).

CAMPBELL, THE

SEAL OF ENGLAND

THE LORD CHANCELLORS AND KEEPERS OF THE GREAT

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

1

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 8

federal courts. He was really a remarkable teacher. He came to
class quite unprepared, but he bubbled. He threw out ideas like
this and had the class actively stimulated from beginning to end.
It could be a seminar that lasted two hours on one aspect of Ex
parte Young,2 for example, and would show more things arising
out of it than any of the students coming to the class could have
imagined. I think he has been somewhat misunderstood in recent times by people who did not know him. I have seen him
treated as an archconservative who held the country back in various and sundry ways. I do not think that is accurate. He really
remained very consistent to his ideals from beginning to end. He
had his failings: he could be irascible and he was as inconsiderate in many ways as anybody I have ever known. If we had a
function at the Harvard Law School at which he was the
honored guest, and it was set for 7:00 p.m., he would show up at
7:45 p.m. Although he was sometimes a little difficult, I would
say that, as far as I am concerned, he is the great man of federal
jurisdiction. The Business of the Supreme Court3 was published
in 1928. I think it is quite fair to say that modern knowledge and
thinking about federal jurisdiction finds its most solid basis in
this book. Some people have said that it was written by Jim
Landis. I have no doubt that most of the footnotes were put together by Jim Landis, but the basic idea and much of the writing undoubtedly came from Felix Frankfurter. That is an irrelevant commentary, but I thought I would like to make it.
PROFESSOR WRIGHT: Dean Carrington, do you want to
correct any misimpressions we may have had of your paper?
DEAN CARRINGTON: I guess I might begin by trying to
rehabilitate it. It was really Shirley Hufstedler's proposal, and I
think Professor Bator rightly corrected a little bit of puckishness
in my advocacy of it. I have advocated other kinds of approaches
and solutions to this sort of problem in the past and have gotten
tired of the indifference with which they have been met. So, I
thought I would try something different.
The virtue of the idea, it seems to me, is that it does rehabilitate the appellate process. If you are concerned about the
amenities of appellate procedure, of finding judges who are willing to listen to argument, who are willing to confer, discuss and
2. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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read the cases on their own, and then write an opinion explaining the result in every case, then you are going to have to adopt
some kind of variation on the Hufstedler plan to accomplish
that. I see no realistic hope that that procedure could be rehabilitated within the existing framework of the United States Courts
of Appeals. Somebody else is going to have to do that. Indeed,
even if you could somehow or other take a great deal of the
workload off the present courts of appeals, I think it would be
difficult to persuade the circuit judges that that was primarily
their task. There is an old saying that once the kids have seen
the city, it is hard to get them back on the farm. I think once
you have got an institution that is accustomed to the kind of
role to which the circuit judges are accustomed, it would not be
very easy to get them back into the rather prosaic work of reading transcripts and paying heed to the specific applications of
the law in particular cases. That is the thrust and purpose of the
proposal.
One of the things that was puckish about my suggestion of
the proposal is that it does leave the existing framework of the
courts of appeals out there with a big question mark around it.
One of my reasons for suggesting it, however, is that it does
force you to think about what is the role of the courts of appeals,
why they are there, and what kind of an organization they
should be. I can come up with a number of schemes that would
respond more effectively. Maybe it might help to flush out my
favoritism for Judge Hufstedler's suggestion by going back to an
idea that I did publish in 1969. 4 I suggested that the United
States Courts of Appeals should be unified into a single court
with the number of judges somewhat reduced. The judges would
be organized according to subject matter panels that would deal
with the cases in different categories, much as the Federal Circuit does now and might include some specialized panels of the
kind that Dean Griswold has advocated. I still think that is a
pretty good idea. I have not heard anything that is terribly
wrong with it, but it is not an idea whose time has come.
My thought was, and is, that maybe if we could rehabilitate
the appeal and recognize that people have a right to have the
district judge's decisions reviewed, that we might, starting with
4. Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the
Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HARv. L. REV. 542, 612-16 (1969).
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that as a premise, address more seriously the structural questions about who and what the present circuit courts are, how
they got to be organized that way, and whether they should continue in their present form.
One other thing I would like to say about the right of appeal. I do think that it needs to be rehabilitated. I believe that
Judge Don Lay is essentially correct: what we now have is only a
nominal right of appeal and, while that may be better than
nothing, it is, in fact, true that in many cases the process
through which we go does not recognize that right of appeal and
something needs to be done about it. 5
I do not think that eliminating the right of appeal makes a
whole lot of difference, as I suggested.' I do not think that it will
save a great deal of time. If a judge has to decide whether to
think about a case, in other words, whether to grant certiorari,
the judge will end up thinking about the merits of the case in
making that limited decision. This reminds me a little of the
story I once used as a challenge, which I used to offer my children as well. It comes from an experience reported by Leo Tolstoy. His older brother used to torment him by telling him that
anything he wanted would happen if he could sit for an hour in
a corner of a room and not think of a white bear. Tolstoy spent a
great deal of his youth sitting in the corner trying not to think of
a white bear, but he always thought of it. My kids found from
the same experience that they could not do it either. Judges trying to exercise discretion about whether to entertain an appeal
will be a little like trying not to think of the white bear. I think
it would be very difficult, impossible in fact, to consider whether
an appeal ought to be heard without trying to decide whether it
is a meritorious appeal. So, I do not think that ends up amounting to much.
I have one other comment, if I may, and this is really a response to Professor Wechsler.7 I would associate myself with virtually everything Dean Griswold said. I also agree that, at least I
hope, I am not advocating a return to the formalism of the
1920s. I think the difference may lie in the nature of the kinds of

5. Lay, A Proposalfor DiscretionaryReview in Federal Courts of Appeals, 34 Sw.
L.J. 1151, 1155 (1981).
6. See Carrington, supra p. 430.
7. See Wechsler, supra p. 444.
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cases we are thinking about. I think it might be useful to offer
an example. When I consider these problems, I think about
quite prosaic cases involving statutory interpretation in which
the need for open-ended consideration of all the social, political,
and economic consequences of the decision is not very great.
Some years ago, I did a little empirical work through the courtesy of the then Solicitor General Griswold. In the course of that
study, I identified one issue in particular that was percolating, as
they like to say. The question was whether or not you could use
foodstamps at a Kentucky Fried Chicken stand. It turned out
that the question was being litigated in seventeen different
United States District Courts by seventeen different franchisers.
It was a question that was going to be presented in every United
States Court of Appeals and the Solicitor General was writing
briefs and making arguments over this. It is the kind of question
over which Congress has the ultimate authority, so it does not
make a whole lot of difference how you answer that question. It
would seem that there might be some great virtue in getting the
matter resolved sooner rather than later, without having it litigated in every district in every circuit and having dozens of lawsuits over what is really a relatively trivial, prosaic question of
statutory interpretation. My sense of it is that the federal system is presently surfeited with issues of that kind, that never get
resolved authoritatively; or they get resolved temporarily for one
part of the country only and, correspondingly, as a result of that,
there is an awful lot of ferment and unnecessary uncertainty at
the level of lawyers giving advice. If you advise the Kentucky
Fried Chicken franchiser in your neighborhood, what do you tell
him about foodstamps? There is not a great deal of virtue in a
system that leaves that kind of question just permanently unsettled. But that seems to be the way our federal judicial system
works at the present time.
JUDGE ROBERT E. KEETON*: I have observed that we
have been bouncing back and forth between two separately identifiable problems, quite appropriately bouncing back and forth
between them because they are interrelated. Nevertheless, one
set of problems is concerned with the institutional structure for
our appellate processes in the federal system, and the other set
* Judge, United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. B.B.A.,
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of problems is concerned with the nature of law and decisionmaking. I want to comment only on the second for a moment-on discretionary justice.
I will look at discretionary justice from perhaps a different
perspective. I will identify it as a users' perspective. Lawyers
and their clients and trial judges are users of this body of precedents and guidance that we are getting from the statutes and the
appellate decisions. On that subject I think there was a consensus developed here today as to the nature of this problem. Now,
let me describe it from the users' perspective:
(1) Putting aside the constitutional problems, which also
may be added, most federal cases involve application of one or
more statutes.
(2) Statutes are seldom clear.
(3) Precedents clarifying statutory meaning are scarce.
(4) If the parties wish a decision, each case must be decided at least in the trial court and, in most instances, through
at least one level of appeal.
Thus, the problem is how do the trial judge and appellate judge
who must decide the case find authoritative guidance as to what
the unclear statute means.
First, let me say that I think it makes a difference what the
judge thinks about this problem. Dean Griswold has spoken of
judges as having too much discretion. I think I now understand
what he is saying, and I do not interpret it as a wish to return to
older days. But let me make my point in another way. I would
draw a sharp distinction between what a judge can get away
with, which might be described as an exercise of discretion in
some sense, and, on the other hand, what a judge should be trying to do. It makes a difference because the judge, whether a
trial judge or an appellate judge, is making a decision that, unless overturned, will be a precedent. When the judge is addressing that kind of question, the judge should not see it as an exercise of discretion. It is an exercise in trying to find an answer as
well as possibly can be found from previous authoritative guidance. If, as usual, the statute does not quite tell you and the
precedents do not quite tell you, it still is not a free exercise of
discretion doing what you want to do. From the trial judge's perspective, I have found that the lawyers never bring to me the
cases that have a clear answer. They settle all of those. The only
cases I have to worry about are the ones in which I do not have
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clear authoritative guidance either in a statute or in the precedents, and I must fashion an answer that the appellate courts
are not tender about reversing, rather than yielding to my exercise of discretion. They look at it de novo, as they should, because it is going to be a precedent. So all I am saying is that this
problem we have been talking about with respect to exercise of
discretion is one to which we should draw this sharp distinction.
Not only do I think it makes a difference what I, as a judge,
think about the problem, I think it makes a difference what you
as lawyers think about it and say about it to the public, and
what the law profession generally, including the professors, say
about it to the students as well as to the public.
JUDGE CONSTANCE B. MOTLEY*: I heard some startling things today to which I think I should reply. It is probably
quite ironic that Professor Bator is on my left. He really should
be on my right. But, since Professor Bator has undertaken to
attack the United States Supreme Court, I think the Court is
entitled to its day in court, and I have elected myself as its attorney in South Carolina. I think the Supreme Court is the
greatest invention since the wheel. If it were not for the Supreme Court, I would not be here. The Supreme Court of the
United States, which has been attacked here today, guided this
nation through the last thirty years, perhaps the most tumultuous period in this nation's history. It is fine to talk about what
the role of the Supreme Court ought to be and how they ought
to read the records and cite precedent and so forth, but when a
nation is convulsed by a social revolution, we have an entirely
different animal, and we can see now in retrospect that the Supreme Court played a role that it did not anticipate. I do not
think anyone did, but the Court played that role successfully.
This is a different America now after thirty or forty years. The
Supreme Court brought black people into the family, so to
speak, as well as women, Asians, you name it. We are in. As a
result, we are looking at a country that no one could have foreseen in 1787 or 1886.
The Supreme Court, in deciding the numerous civil rights
cases brought before it in the last four decades, was literally
forced to decide those cases because there was no other branch
* Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.
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of the government politically secure enough to respond to the
social demands of the last thirty or forty years. It may well be
that we have come to the end of the period when the Supreme
Court will be the branch of government responding to social upheaval. Certainly, if there is a change in the Supreme Court beyond what we presently have, we might well see the Supreme
Court revert to its prior position of a "gray eminence" somewhere in Washington from which no one ever hears. In a dynamic society such as ours, people are going to find a way to get
issues resolved. If the Supreme Court is going to be unresponsive, there are going to be other forums to which the people will"
turn. As someone suggested earlier, I think we may be seeing
that already-people have rediscovered the state court. I have
been surprised myself at some of the decisions by the courts of
the State of New York in recent years that go beyond anything
the Supreme Court of the United States has dared to pronounce,
such as a state constitutional right to shelter in a suit brought
by the homeless.
When we talk about the problems of the federal courts, I
think we have to bear in mind that nobody can see the future.
We do not know what it is going to be. But when we have these
problems presented to us, I certainly think we should be grateful
that there is an established legal community that might guide us
through this period.
As Professor Bator said, there has been very little said
about the contribution of the legal profession to our problems. I
think another thing worth noting is that in the last two decades
there has been a tremendous change in the profession itself. The
legal profession may not be a profession any longer. It may well
be that it is a business, just like any other big business in the
United States. In New York City, which is the legal community
of which I am a part, we have seen greater specialization by law
firms. We have seen a tremendous influx of lawyers into the profession itself in the last thirty years after the Supreme Court's
decision in Brown v. Board of Education.8 It seems like the
brightest and best of our students went to law school; therefore,
we presently have a bumper crop of lawyers.
In addition to the increase in the size of the profession, we

8. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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have new people in the profession, most notably women. When I
first went on the federal bench in 1966, I think there were only
five women in the country who were federal judges. I think the
number today is at least fifty, a tremendous increase in the last
twenty years. Of course, women will tell you it should be much
more than that, but still it is a change. Also, in 1966 if I saw a
woman appear in court, I would tell everybody at dinner that
night, "I saw a woman today." Now, there are sometimes nothing but women in my courtroom. I once had an all-woman jury.
Somebody said to me after the jury was selected, "A newspaperman is outside your door. He wants your comment on the fact
that you have all women on the jury." Well, I had not even noticed it. In the very same case, a woman was going to represent
the Government in this big Mafioso case. When I first came on
the court in 1966, they did not even let women in the Criminal
Division of the United States Attorney's Office. Now, at least a
third, I should think, of the United States Attorneys in the
Southern District of New York are women. Women represent a
new cadre revitalizing the legal profession and they are, of
course, extraordinarily able women. In addition, we have minorities in the legal profession who came into the profession after
the Supreme Court's decision in Brown. In Brown black lawyers
were able to demonstrate, for the first time in the history of this
country, their ability to take a case from a federal district court
or state court to the United States Supreme Court and prevail.
This brought young blacks into the profession. I think when I
graduated from Columbia Law School forty years ago, there may
have been 1100 black laywers in the entire country. I do not
know what the figure is today, but I would venture to say it is at
least ten times that figure.
So, it is fair to say that this profession has changed, and
with it, of course, comes new litigation and new areas to explore.
Someone once said, "I do not see any abatement in sight unless
there is going to be some new dramatic legislation." Apparently,
as more of these cases come into the federal courts, we are going
to be inundated with litigation for the foreseeable future. Last
year, the Southern District of New York had the highest number
of cases filed-11,000-since we were authorized twenty-seven
judges. The figures show that every year the caseload just goes
up and up and up. In addition, we do not have any more help.
We still have only two law clerks. They have four at the Su-
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preme Court level; each judge at the court of appeals level has
three. We do not have any more help at the district court level. I
happen to have three because I am the Chief Judge, but everybody else normally has two, and that is what we had when I
started twenty years ago. So, we just work ourselves harder and
harder, and our law clerks have to work harder and harder at
this caseload. That, however, is the kind of society we are in. We
are a new society, and you have to go to Europe to really appreciate how young we really are, and how this society is just developing. The United States is a very affluent society, and I think
that accounts for the situation that we are in. The best that we
can hope for is that our creativity and our ingenuity will continue to prevail so that we can continue to come up with devices
that do help alleviate the situation some. You have heard that
historically that has been the case, and I do not see any reason
why in the future we would not be able to come up with some
remedies for the present caseload.
PROFESSOR BATOR: I find myself very comfortable on
Judge Motley's left. I feel honored and pleased to sit next to her.
I am willing to sit on her right or her left, anywhere she would
like to put me. I say that as a joke, but it is also because I think
that what I tried to say about the Supreme Court does not position me on the political spectrum. I do not know why it is
thought that it is a symptom of this horrible and fatal disease of
conservatism to criticize the Court on the ground of the professional quality of its opinions. I certainly do not want to make
too much of it, but I do not think Judge Motley has any right to
assume because I criticize the Court on those grounds that I am
less committed to Brown v. Board of Education or the many
great things the Court has done in transforming and bringing
justice to society than she is.
I would like to connect that with a more general point. I
really am in profound disagreement with what might be called
the current scoring system that we have for the Supreme Court
and all our courts, but particularly for the Supreme Court. This
system simply counts results and assigns Justices, judges, courts,
commentators, and critics to the "good guy" camp and "bad
guy" camp. If you criticize the "good guys," you are automatically a "bad guy." That is really the name of the game: whether
you are sympathetic ideologically with this large movement or
that large movement in the progress and march of the law.
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A different scoring system, which, by the way, I think is the
particular responsibility of professors, used to be very much the
style of academic criticism of the courts. It has gone out of fashion, and I regret that. I have in mind a system that scores not in
terms of whether the "good guy" or "bad guy" results have been
reached, but whether the professional quality of the judgments
and of the opinions is excellent. This is not just a technical matter, but a moral matter, too-whether the judge has respected
the moralities of the craft that are, in a sense, the judge's dues
to society. The pledge the judge gives to society in return for
these awesome powers is a sense of intellectual and professional
discipline towards the law.
I thought the problem I speak of was depressingly evident
in the hearings and the debate on the Rehnquist nomination. All
of the discussion was in terms of the "good guy"/"bad guy"
camps and in terms of results. There was little discussion about
professional qualities and what professional and intellectual moralities he might or might not bring to the Court.
I think that the Supreme Court is a troubled institution,
even though it is a great institution. The very fact that it is a
great institution, however, seems to evoke the responsibility to
give thoughtful criticism to whether it is performing its functions in a way that meets professional and intellectual criteria of
excellence. I think it is a very profoundly troubled institution
and to acknowledge that is not an attack either on the Court or
on the ideals that Judge Motley so eloquently spoke of here.
DEAN EDWARD H. COOPER*: If I am going to get a
chance to say anything, I had better try it now. I mean to suggest that the problems are in some ways more difficult than anyone has suggested yet. I also mean to suggest a couple of small,
niggling questions about a couple of the proposals that have
been made and then to come full circle to a somewhat different
way of describing the difficulty of institutional reform in the federal court structure we know today.
First, a broad description of the problem begins with the
first step of asking how much we want law to do for us in society. We really have not decided that. A subcategory of that is
how much we want federal law to do out of that realm of chores
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of Michigan
Law School. A.B., 1961, Dartmouth College; LL.B., 1964, Harvard University.
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that we assign to law to do for us. What we are experiencing for
the time being is a very substantial expansion in what sorts of
problems we ask the law to solve for us and in our temptation to
have federal law do those things for us. The more we do that,
the more we are asking of the federal court system. It seems to
me almost inevitable that we are not going to be federalizing
things, making them into federal law, and then leaving them
very much, very often, to state courts. If we go that way, we will
have another set of problems and another set of institutional
dilemmas.
The starting point, then, will have to be with the district
court structure. How many district courts should be set up and
in what way, with how much bureaucratization; how many levels
and tiers of systems between the judge and the task of decision
can be tolerated; and how far we can expand that system, obviously are unclear. The focus of the conversation today has been
primarily on the assumption that the district court system is
more expandable than the appellate structure. That may be.
Nonetheless, that itself may be a point of great initial difficulty.
The next step, if I can use for the moment, I think, an inaccurate label, could be described as the case-specific review function of insuring accurate application of "the law" to each case, of
achieving justice between the litigants, and of assuring resolution of the dispute in a proper way. That is the function upon
which Dean Carrington is focusing, although my description of it
is a bit slippery in worrying whether that function is now being
performed as well as it ought to be performed. There is a second
function that we keep talking about: the function of developing
the law, that is, of judge lawmaking. That is the point at which
we are decrying the loss of command by the courts of appeals
over the district courts, the absence of any system of achieving
dependable national uniformity. Part of the difficulty comes precisely at that point.
The twin functions are really not very separate. The assurance of accurate application of the law requires some sense of
what the law is. Indeed, it is only by reviewing the applications
of the law that you can often understand the underlying concept
of law that led to the decision. I do not think they can be separated. Even if they could, our tradition, and here I go back
before Baron Parke, is the tradition that the legitimacy of judicial lawmaking depends upon their deciding cases. If we are go-
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ing to ask all of these things of the courts, it is going to be extraordinarily difficult to separate judicial lawmaking from the
task of reviewing and deciding individual cases. We are sort of
stuck with that. All those images still tend to focus on one sort
of judicial function-the function of dispute resolution, of essentially people-to-people kinds of disputes.
We have just been reminded that we also have asked of our
courts a quite different kind of function. A function for which
under current concepts of justiciability cases are often made.
Cases are crafted specifically as test cases for the purpose of performing institutional social reform. This is really an enterprise
distinct from the enterprise of resolving ordinary people disputes. That kind of function, I suppose, is and must remain
uniquely a function of the Supreme Court. We have to find some
way to work that function into the system.
How do we do all that? One possibility, which strikes me as
quite plausible in the field of tax law, is the specialized court. In
other fields, without saying that specialized courts will not come
to be both the accepted and acceptable answer, let me suggest
doubts of two different sorts.
One doubt is simply uneasiness about the prospect of expertise. Judge Wilkinson suggests that judges of specialized courts
may become captive of the forces that champion their appointment. 9 There is, I suspect, a related danger that they may become captives of the institutions they are specifically charged
with reviewing. The antitrust FTC court, for example, could become too much a captive of the Antitrust Division and the
Trade Commission. I think there is also a much deeper danger
of becoming captive of your own expertise. It is the danger of
believing, really fully believing, all the nonsense that gets established in far too many areas of expert understanding. I speak to
that with some passion from the antitrust perspective. I have
taught antitrust for many years. It has gone through some remarkable changes in that period of time. However, we have not
yet reached anything that dispassionate analysis could pass for
enduring wisdom, or so I suspect.
The second doubt concerns a different kind of problem,
which is the technical lawyer's problem. It is the problem of de-

9. See Wilkinson, supra p. 442.
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fining jurisdiction in ways that do not, of themselves, yield untoward results. One possibility in rather broad terms is to define
jurisdiction according to issues-to assign cases between tribunals according to the issue that is to be decided. Obviously, this
leads to some difficulty in deciding what issues each case
presents, but it also leads to the prospect of bifurcated appeals.
The same case might have different issues appealable to two different tribunals. The price that would be paid for that is very
dear. The alternative is to have case review. The Federal Circuit,
which has been offered as an example several times today, has
jurisdiction over, among other things, any case in which the jurisdiction of the district court is founded on the patent or plant
protection act jurisdiction conferred by title 28, section 1338 of
the United States Code. 10 This means they get the whole case.
Difficult problems are encountered in assigning interlocutory review and assigning review in cases in which the patent issues
have dropped out in an early stage. It also means that the court
must decide all issues. By what law does it decide them? It decides them by the law of the regional circuit. The Federal Circuit has taken clear positions as to matters of both procedural
and substantive federal law. It will decide all the issues of the
case, other than the issues that support its jurisdiction, according to the law of the regional circuit. That is a very difficult
chore for a specialized tribunal to undertake. There are very
good reasons for doing it that way, but there is also a steep price
to pay for having a specialized tribunal decide these issues. Accordingly, the path of specialization has both institutional dangers and niggling jurisdictional questions that should make it
the subject of careful consideration before embracing its promise
to achieve nationwide uniformity.
In the category of deeper problems, there are questions
that, in a sense, go back to those questions asked initially. What
will we ask of the law? Particularly, what will we ask of the federal law? What will we ask of the federal law when Congress
itself does not know what it wants and passes the questions over
to the courts? The structure of our current body of federal law,
both substance and procedure, is a function of the court system
we have, or that which we think we have. In deciding how much

10. 28 U.S.C § 1338 (1982).
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federal law to make and what kinds of problems to give over to
the federal courts, Congress has relied upon the quality and the
character of the court system. If we are to undertake serious
tinkering with the system, either in the direction that emphasizes case-specific review at the expense of national uniformity
or in the direction that emphasizes the opportunity to make the
law nationally uniform at the expense of case-specific review, we
will be tinkering with a system that has much more hanging in
the balance than the simple court structure we now know or the
question of what to do with 186 active court of appeals judges if
we decide to create an appellate division for the district court
and find the courts of appeals no longer necessary.
The problems are profound, and I suspect the current
course of wisdom would be to go slowly. The intercircuit tribunal is a very modest proposal, one that carries very little cost. I
believe that sort of interim proposal is a much wiser and safer
course for the federal courts than some of the bolder and more
imaginative ideas that we will be forced to confront in short
order.
PROFESSOR WRIGHT: Dean Cooper, I wonder if you are
not too quick in writing off the possibility of leaving some cases
that arise under federal law to state court decision. It seems to
me that that has some promise. Judge Motley, Dean Griswold,
and Professor Wechsler all have advocated this as one solution
to the problem 1 because reducing the number of cases that
come into the district courts automatically affects what gets to
the courts of appeals. Since 1875 we seem to have taken it for
granted that if a case is based on federal law, a federal court is
the proper place to take it. I wonder if we do not need to reexamine that.
Clearly, there are some issues of federal law that are so important that we want to make a federal forum available for
them. I doubt if that is true of all issues concerning federal law.
For example, I do not see why we need to have a federal court
administering the Federal Employers' Liability Act.12 State
courts have great experience in tort litigation; I think they could
easily handle all of those cases. There is a rather obscure case
that came down on July 7th of this year that suggests at least a
11. See, e.g., Motley, supra p. 470.
12. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1982).
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possibility along these lines. It is Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals
Inc. v. Thompson,13 a bitterly divided, five-to-four decision. The
premise of Justice Stevens' opinion for the Court is that whether
a court should take federal question jurisdiction depends upon
the importance of having a federal court determine the particular issues involved. I have to agree that it was not especially important for a federal court to decide a tort case in which three of
four claims are wholly state-created, and the fourth possible
ground for recovery is a claim based on a federal statute that
itself does not provide any private remedy, and everybody
agreed you could not imply such a remedy from the statute. If
we can sweep a number of cases that have federal elements of
law in them to the state court, where the Supreme Court ultimately can review if the state court goes badly awry in its interpretation of the federal statute, more room is left in the federal
courts for the issues that clearly are of importance in the special
role of the federal government. It seems to me that it is no coincidence that the only two organized groups of which I am aware
who are lobbying to have diversity jurisdiction abolished (something that I strongly support) are the NAACP and the American
Civil Liberties Union. Why? Because they recognize that if you
can take what today amounts to roughly one-fourth of the civil
cases out of the calendar of the district courts, the district courts
will have that much more capacity to take the kinds of cases
involving civil rights that these organizations are interested in.
Also, putting some of these cases primarily into the state
courts gives you another automatic advantage. Through the
state courts, you get a four-tier court system, with three levels of
appeal, since almost all states have an intermediate appellate
court. The Supreme Court, therefore, would be a fourth-tier
court. If we were to try to do that directly on the federal side, we
would get all sorts of objections. This way, we can do it by
indirection.
DEAN COOPER: One of my colleagues, who really teaches
criminal procedure, which I think is a rather rare sort of event,
nevertheless takes note of constitutional criminal procedure
from time to time. He has hypothesized to me that the average
state trial court judge with criminal jurisdiction decides more

13. 106 S. Ct. 3229 (1986).
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federal questions and constitutional questions in a given year
than the average federal district judge. I am not sure, however,
whether that is an accurate hypothesis. Obviously, there are a
great many federal questions that are resolved by state courts
today. The limits on section 133114 jurisdiction insure that will
happen and will continue to happen until there is a drastic revision in the rules, including, for instance, the right of removal of
federal question defense cases. The price that is paid is exactly
the price that we have been talking about. Instead of eleven regional circuit courts of appeals plus various other courts resolving federal questions, it is fifty states plus the District of Columbia system, in addition to the federal courts. We must resolve
questions of how much uniformity we want.
The Supreme Court went through much argument about
the proper use of its certiorari jurisdiction in an effort to achieve
some uniformity in FELA cases. There was a period of trying to
teach lower courts, including lower state courts, that they really
must understand, even though the Supreme Court could not say
it directly, that the FELA is a workers' compensation system administered by jury trial. The lower courts finally got the message
from the Court. The cost of doing this, however, was a very substantial drain on the Court's docket for a number of years, and
we all pay that price.
I am not questioning the ability of state courts to do it.
They decide federal questions regularly. Professor Meador says
twenty-eight percent of the decisions he surveyed had actual
holdings that necessarily disposed of a federal question. 15 That
is a lot of federal questions. We can do more and more of it if we
are willing to give up the image of opportunity for uniformity.
PROFESSOR WRIGHT: Let me just add one more thought
on that point. The Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade
Commission Improvement Act"6 provides that if you want to
bring your case in federal court, your claim has to be at least
$50,000. This is a much higher jurisdictional amount than in any
other kind of litigation. It would seem to me that if Congress felt
comfortable with the way state courts administered the statute
it passed, as it must have because the great bulk of claims are
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).
15. See Meador, supra p. 455.
16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1982).
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less than $50,000, it could have gone all the way and enacted
rules about warranties, but have left their resolution wholly to
the state courts. Of course, you could get occasional problems,
such as the ones I remember very well about the FELA, but I
share Judge Wilkinson's perception that the state courts today
are not the same state courts that we had in the 1950s, 17 and
that Congress might think it perfectly safe to rely on the state
courts entirely for the enforcement of some of these statutes in
areas where there can be perceived an advantage in having some
uniform rule on products liability.
DEAN CARRINGTON: That might be the opening wedge
in the process of the federalization of the state judiciary. Well, it
is not an opening wedge because it is already in progress, but it
is a step in that process. Congress does, from time to time, in the
process of the federalization of the state judiciary consider legislation under the rubric of the Federal Courts Improvement Act
of 1982,18 which in a variety of different ways undertakes to help
the state courts become better, which means to become more
like federal courts. One surmises that if you were to go very far
down the trail of sending federal cases into state courts, that
Congress and the pressure groups and political organizations
that deal with Congress would want to take a greater interest in
the quality of the state courts and might use the power of the
federal purse to obtain a lot of results. Some of this would be
very benign, and we might someday end up with a unified judicial system. That strikes me as not an improbable result. As
Judge Motley suggests, we are a young culture. It took the English five hundred years to consolidate the common-law courts.
Maybe in five hundred years we can eliminate the federal judiciary altogether.
PROFESSOR MEADOR: I think that is a very plausible
prediction. Congress just created the State Justice Institute,
which is a federally authorized corporation whose sole mission in
life is to spend federal money to help state courts. 9 This is a
permanent organization. A lot of state court funding had been

17. See Wilkinson, supra p. 441.

18. Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified in scattered titles of U.S.C.).
19. See State Justice Institute Act of 1984, 42 U.S.C. §§ 10,701-10,713 (Supp. II

1984 & Supp. III 1985).
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done under LEAA, 20 but that was a rather temporary thing. The
Institute is an effort by Congress to channel federal money to
state courts.
In addition, I think Professor Wright's idea of channeling
federal cases into state courts is a rather promising one. I have
been taken with that for sometime myself.
All these things are interrelated; therefore, as Dean Cooper
points out, if you channel the federal cases into state courts at
the trial level, that pig is going to come out at the other end of
the tunnel at the top-the appellate level-as a federal case reviewable by the Supreme Court. This simply exacerbates the existing problem of an overload at the top of the system, which
brings us back around to the question of what we are going to do
about that. In recent years the idea of creating a federal appellate tribunal whose mission will be to review state court decisions on federal questions has been put forward several times. I
believe this may have a good deal of promise. It would just be
another variation on the theme of reorganizing the federal appellate structure along subject matter lines. One category that
could be created is an appellate tribunal reviewing all state court
decisions, and then that one tribunal would be reviewable by the
Supreme Court on writ of certiorari. But the appellate tribunal
would collect fifty-two jurisdictions into a single forum, resulting
in a weeding out or screening process before the fifty-two would
hit the Supreme Court directly. I think all of that has some potential and I would anticipate and predict developments in that
direction, but slowly and haltingly.
PROFESSOR WRIGHT: Would you be willing, Professor
Meador, to do something more limited in the first instance since
we know how hard it is to achieve any reform? I, too, am taken
with the idea of a federal appellate court reviewing state court
decisions, but I think that would be much more salable if the
reform were similar to the idea Clement Haynsworth put forward about twelve years ago. He proposed a federal court that

20. Law Enforcement Assistance Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-197, 79 Stat. 828
amended by Pub. L. No. 89-798, 80 Stat. 1506 (1966) (authorizing expenditures for four
fiscal years for federal programs, administered by various federal agencies, for the purpose of assisting in training state and local law enforcement officers and criminal justice
administration officials in the improvement of their capabilities and techniques).
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would review state court criminal decisions. 1 I think that would
be salable because if you have a federal court at that stage in the
appellate process, it makes it a much more powerful tool with
which to cut back on the scope of habeas corpus. I believe not
only all the federal lower court judges, but virtually all the state
judges, would support such a scheme. The state courts might not
like being reviewed by a federal court lower than the Supreme
Court, but they would welcome any cutback on federal habeas
corpus for state prisoners. Therefore, I think it is conceivable
that something of this sort might be salable. If it works, it would
be a lot easier to broaden the jurisdiction of the court because it
is an existing court.
PROFESSOR MEADOR: I certainly agree in essence with
that. I remember Judge Haynsworth's article. I thought it was a
very good idea at that time. One objection made to it was that
an appellate court with exclusively criminal jurisdiction would
bring out some of the dark and unseemly political forces to
which Judge Wilkinson alluded.22 It would tend to focus all of
the emotion involved with the law and order versus individual
rights debates on the selection of judges. That does not bother
me greatly, but it is, I think, part of political reality that such
opposition may be there. On the other hand, as you say, it may
be more politically salable to start with that first step rather
than empowering the court with total jurisdiction over all state
decisions.
JUDGE WILKINSON: It seems to me, and again this is impressionistic, that the single portion of our docket growing by
leaps and bounds is the diversity portion. There are months
when as many as ten of the twenty cases on which we hear oral
argument are diversity cases. Many should have gone to state
court, but many litigants and lawyers are voting with their feet
for federal court. The cases often involve very complex commercial litigation to which we must devote our full attention. There
have been calls either to abolish diversity jurisdiction or to limit
its invocation. Yet, the support in Congress for those steps is
about the same as the support for raising the salaries of federal

21. Haynsworth, A New Court to Improve the Administration of Justice, 59 A.B.
J. 841 (1973); see also Haynsworth, Improving the Handling of Criminal Cases in the
Federal Appellate System, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 597 (1973).
22. See Wilkinson, supra p. 442.
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judges; that is, there is not much support at all.
The other question that Professor Meador raises concerns
the absence of a constitutency for structural reform of the federal court system. I wonder if there is widespread public dissatisfaction within the bar and among the public-at-large with the
job that the federal courts are doing today. As I understand the
history that Dean Carrington has detailed, the genesis of the Evarts Act was the widespread perception of the district judge as
tyrant.28 Does anything like that degree of public dissatisfaction
with the functioning of the federal court system exist today?
Congress wants to keep diversity jurisdiction; litigants opt for
federal court on diversity cases; and structural reforms are hard
to come by. Is the lesson of all these individual signs that a large
number of people are more or less satisfied with the kind of justice that they are getting from the federal courts? It is tough, I
think, on those of us who work within the system, and who are
familiar with the crunch of work, and who want more time to
devote to each case; we have our frustrations. Those who think
about the federal court system in the next century and how we
are going to cope with all these things also have their misgivings.
I wonder, however, if the public as a whole is not relatively well
satisfied, and if this satisfaction might be the problem with reforms getting off the ground.
PROFESSOR BATOR: Speaking only to Judge Wilkinson's
last point, I am also rather puzzled on whether there is dissatisfaction and what its nature is. If I think only about the point
that Dean Carrington emphasized, which is the review process in
cases in which the problem is very fact-bound and where there is
not significant disagreement or uncertainty about the applicable
law,24 I simply am puzzled whether, although there has been a
reduction in the amenities of the process and in many of those
cases you get no argument or very short time to argue, there is a
serious sense of injustice and short shrift on the parts of litigants and lawyers. Where I think there is great unhappiness and
dissatisfaction, though, is on the side of the thing that Dean
Griswold emphasized.25 I think those lawyers and litigants who

23. See Carrington, supra p. 413-14.
24. See generally Carrington, The Function of the Civil Appeal: A Late-Century
View, 38 S.C.L. REV. 411 (1987).
25. See generally Griswold, The Federal Courts Today and Tomorrow: A Summary
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try to operate in an area where the law is uncertain feel very
unsatisfied with how difficult and frustrating it is to try to get
some kind of sensible and intelligible guidelines on how enterprise ought to operate.
I think that the most serious problem is in the area of business and commercial affairs and the economic life of the country. It is a frustrating sort of dissatisfaction. Lawyers have a bit
of a conflict of interest because, on the one hand, it is rather
frustrating not to be able to tell the client about the situation,
on the other hand, all this litigation and sense of uncertainty
generates a huge business for firms and lawyers. I do have a
sense that the business community is rather baffled and that it
feels that it is captive of the system. I think the business community is just baffled about what we do and what we can do,
and its dissatisfactions are not easy to register.
JUDGE MOTLEY: If there is not presently public dissatisfaction with the situation, I think it will appear very soon. I
think the reason we have so many diversity cases is that lawyers
in New York, at least, perceive the federal courts as a place
where the judges, rightly or wrongly, are better judges than the
state court judges and where the calendars move more rapidly.
What they are forgetting is that if they continue to bring these
diversity cases into the federal courts, we will soon be like the
state courts. I gave you the statistic for our court last
year-11,000 civil cases. We presently have twenty-five judges.
Our full complement is twenty-seven, but we rarely have our full
complement. The state court system must have 30,000 civil cases
pending. Therefore, the state court is jammed, and lawyers feel
that they cannot get their cases moving. Consequently, they
come over to the federal court. Jack Weinstein, the Chief Judge
of the Eastern District of New York, told our Judicial Conference a couple of weeks ago that he gives it a year for his court to
be just like a state court with respect to the number of cases
docketed and the inability to get the cases moving, unless something is done about the situation.
Also, lawyers' perception of the federal judges as being more
able than state court judges is probably not altogether correct.
Moreover, I would venture to say that unless Congress takes se-

and Survey, 38 S.C.L. REv. 393 (1987).
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riously the matter of judges' salaries, for which we can get no
support, there will be a more serious problem with the quality of
the federal judiciary. I think the problem is particularly acute
right now. We are not going to be able to attract able lawyers to
the federal court unless something is done about the salary situation. I have a law clerk who graduated from New York University a year ago. She clerked for me this year. She is leaving to go
to a Wall Street firm. She was offered a job at Cravath, Swaine
& Moore, one of the largest law firms in New York. She did not
take that job, but, if she had accepted that job, her salary one
year out of law school would have been $75,000. Federal district
judges make $78,700 a year. In other words, a first-year lawyer
now makes in New York as much as a federal judge. One does
not have to be very bright to know that somebody five years out
of law school with the same firm is making three times as much
as federal judges are making. That kind of situation will lead to
the abler people in the legal profession simply not accepting positions on the federal court. In the past we have had judges
leave, particularly after the last salary raise when we had three
judges from our court leave, because they just could not live on
the salary. Now they are making $300,000 a year. We have to do
something about the situation in the federal courts because that
problem is real and it is getting worse.
PROFESSOR WECHSLER: I just wanted to add a footnote
on the question of lawyer dissatisfaction with arrangements such
as oral argument or screening and these other incidents or
amenities as the speakers call them. In the work on the Hruska
Commission, our staff did quite a good deal of surveying of lawyer sentiment about the current rules on these matters in various circuits. The interesting thing that emerged was that, on the
whole, the lawyers seem to be satisfied with these arrangements,
which to us on the Commission seemed questionable. Moreover,
their responses seemed to be determined primarily by what the
existing situation was. The following example will illustrate this
point: If you put the question to lawyers in the Fifth Circuit
whether the arrangement in the Fourth Circuit would be acceptable, the answer would very likely be no; however, if you put the
question to lawyers in the Fourth Circuit whether the arrangement in the Fourth Circuit was acceptable, then the answer was,
I think, quite universally yes. No circuit was found in which the
lawyers predominantly were dissatisfied with the existing situa-
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tion. I think the lesson to be learned is that not much significance can be afforded to the state of satisfaction or dissatisfaction. I think these are issues that call for specialized judgment.
PROFESSOR WRIGHT: I have two footnotes to add. One
is directed to what Judge Motley just said. My understanding of
the salary structure at Cravath, Skadden Arps, and the other
firms that are equivalent to Cravath, is that if the law clerk, instead of going into practice after a year with Judge Motley, had
gone on and clerked a second year with the Supreme Court and
then had gone to Cravath two years out of law school, her starting salary would be $99,000, more than the Justice of the United
States Supreme Court for whom she had clerked. That does
seem a little odd.
The other is with regard to what Professor Wechsler just
said. He would remember, I know, that when we were bringing
26
the American Law Institute study of jurisdiction (ALI Study)
to a close in the late 1960s, a resolution was transmitted to us
from the Multnomah County Bar Association in Oregon. I believe that is where Portland, Oregon, is. The resolution said that
we favor all proposals in the ALI Study to expand federal jurisdiction, and we are opposed to all of the proposals of the ALI
Study to cut back on federal jurisdiction. This would seem to
indicate a very high degree of satisfaction by our consumers.
Yet, I bet if you would put that to the test by saying, "You love
the federal court so much, we will make federal jurisdiction exclusive in every case to which it applies," the Multnomah
County Bar Association to a man and woman would have said,
"We do not want that at all. What we would like is having a
choice so that we can be wonderful tacticians and decide where
we are best off in any particular case." In South Carolina, in a
personal injury case, the plaintiff's lawyer wants to be in state
court, the defendant's lawyer wants desperately to be in federal
court, and each resorts to absurd maneuvers to try to create or
defeat diversity. In Pennsylvania it is just the opposite. The
plaintiff's bar there appoints administrators from across the Del-

26.
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aware River because they want to manufacture diversity if they
can. So, it has great variations.
END OF PANEL DISCUSSION
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